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Impact of Trading Gains on Economic Growth in BRICs for 1995-2010: 




Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC)
1  account for 37 percent of the planet’s 
land and 40 percent of its population. Their efforts at catching up with the advanced 
economies  has  been  described  in  detail  by  O’Neill  (2001),  and  Wilson  and 
Purushothaman  (2003)  using  a  conventional  growth  accounting  [total  factor 
productivity (TFP)].     
As they predicted over the past decade, the weight of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India  and  China)  in  the  world  GDP  at  a  current  US$  basis  markedly  grew  from  8 
percent in 2000 to 18 percent in 2010 and China contributed half the advance.
2  In 2010, 
BRIC GDP in US$ on a PPP basis was 25 percent of the global total. The share of the 
BRIC countries in the G6 GDP at a current US$ basis increased from 13 percent in 
2000 to 37 percent in 2010. The BRICs accounted for 15 perce nt of world exports. 
China’s GDP exceeded Japan’s by 8 percentage points at end-2010 measured in current 
dollars, and it hopes to overtake America soon.     
                                                 
1  BRIC excludes South Africa. See BRICS Joint statistical Publication, 2011 available at the website of 
National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
2  The figures in this section are based on IMF,  The World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011, IFS 
and the websites of the statistics authorities of the BRICs. For India during 2008-2010, the data of the 
press release of the Indian Central Statistics Office dated February 7, 2011 are employed.             2 
 
In 2009 the global financial crisis caused a 2 percent drop in world GDP, but the 
BRICs expanded by 4.3 percent despite Russia’s 7.8 percent contraction. China and 
India were the pacesetters. In 2010 the BRICs GDP surged by 8.8 percent.         
In  this  paper,  we  analyze  the  determinants  of  BRIC  economic  growth  by 
comparing the dynamics of real GDI (gross domestic income) with GDP for 1995-2010 
including the period of the global financial crisis. Real GDI measures the purchasing 
power of a country’s total income generated by its domestic production (SNA2008, 
section 15.188). Real GDI is defined as “command-basis GDP” by the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. In an open economy the real GDI is real GDP plus the trading gain 
(or loss) including currency appreciation and depreciation. Accordingly, the trading gain 
is defined as the difference between the real GDI and GDP. It arises from changes in the 
terms of trade, defined as the ratio of the export price P




m. In general, if imports and exports are large relative to GDP and if the terms of 
trade markedly change due to a large increase in export prices relative to import prices 
or  a  decrease  in  import  prices  relative  to  export  prices,  the  magnitude  of  potential 
trading gains or losses would be large, as was shown in Russia for 2008-2010.     
The big finding of this econometric inquiry is that the Asian BRICs, China and 
India were hardly affected by oil price shocks and associated changes in terms of trade, 
even  during  the  global  depression  2008-2010.  Ceteris  paribus,  they  appear  well 
positioned to withstand future external shocks, whereas Russia’s prospects appear to 





2. An Overview of Economic Growth in the BRICs     
Figure 1 shows the GDP growth of the BRICs for 2000-2010.
3  As can be seen, 
China grew fastest, followed by India, Russia and Brazil. The average annual growth 
rates of China, India, Russia and Brazil for 2000 -2010 were 10.5 percent, 7.8 percent, 
4.8  percent  and  3.6  percent  respectively.  Russia’s  growth  paced  India’s  before  the 
global  financial  crisis.  In  2009,  however  Russian  GDP  contracted,  whereas  India 
continued to grow rapidly. Thereafter, Russia’s growth path followed Brazil’s lead.   
           
Figure 1 GDP Growth in BRICs in the 2000s 









Figure 2 shows BRIC growth for the extended period 1990-2010. China and India 
grew fastest over this interval with the average 10.4 percent and 6.6 percent respectively. 
Brazil showed steady growth at the average growth rate of 3.1 percent. In contrast, 
                                                 
3  Here, in addition to the data mentioned in the footnote 2, we employ the United Nations online database 
of the main aggregates (the 2011 version released in December, 2010) for 1990-2009, and the CEIC 
online database for 2005-2010. Russia’s data are based on the updated GDP series provided on the 
website of its statistics office named Rosstat as of April 1, 2011.   4 
 
Russia’s GDP in 2010 was 1.07 times its level in 1990 due to the post-Soviet economic 
collapse in the early 1990s. Russia’s average growth rate was only 0.34 percent for 
1990-2000. This rate was less than Japan’s low rate of 0.94 percent for the same period. 
Even though the composition of Russia’s GDP became more consumer oriented, growth 
point to point is negligible.
4  Russia’s per capita GDP at a current US$ is about 10,000 
US$, well below the level of the advanced countries.       
                
Figure 2 GDP Growth in BRICs for 1990-2010 









GDP at a current US$ basis is important from the point of view of a country’s 
collective and individual purchasing power for tradable goods and services. In particular 
                                                 
4  Let us index the GDP level (Russia’s peak) in 1989 as 100. Using the official, updated data, Russia’s 
GDP level accounts for 99.9 in 2009 and 103.9 in 2010. Using our estimate of the growth rate of minus 
0.6 percent for 1990 (Kuboniwa and Ponomarenko, 2000 and Rosefielde and Kuboniwa, 2003) and the 
official data for 1991-2010, it accounts for 102.4 in 2009 and 106.5 in 2010. Anyway, in our estimation, 
during the global financial crisis Russia’s GDP was slightly over its peak level. 5 
 
it is important for a country such as Russia with free FOREX market and strong demand 
for imports..   
Figure  3  shows  BRIC  GDP  in  billions  of  current  US$.  It  shows  that  China 
overtook Japan in 2010. The US GDP was still 2.5 times larger than the Chinese GDP 
in 2010. However, China seems poised to close the gap. Its GDP in 2010 was 5 times 
that in 1990. The Soviet dream of overtaking America voiced by Nikita Khrushchev 50 
years ago, might come true in China.   
 












Brazil’s GDP decreased 1995-2002 and then steadily rose until 2008. It fell slightly 
again during the global financial crisis, but rapidly recovered in 2010. Brazil’s GDP is 
the second highest in the BRIC hierarchy.   6 
 
Russia’s GDP plummeted after August 1998 financial crisis, finally reaching rock 
bottom in 1999. It recovered steadily until 2008, catching up with Brazil. Thereafter 
Russia’s GDP in 2008 was 8.5 times that in 1999, due mostly to currency appreciation. 
China’s GDP in 2008 was only 4 times that in 1999 on the same basis. This marked 
growth  of  Russia’s  current  GDP  contributed  to  a  large  improvement  in  the  living 
standard  of  Russians  for  the  same  period.  Russia’s  current  and  real  GDP  however, 
contracted  sharply  during  the  2008  global  financial  crisis,  even  though  ruble 
depreciation remained within a very limited range. Russia also showed a rapid recovery 
in 2010 but its GDP level was still lowest in the BRICs.   
India’s GDP also is catching up with Brazil. Its GDP growth slowed during the 
global financial crisis, but it did not decline. It’s GDP is the second smallest of the 
BRICs. 
 
3. From Dutch to Russian Disease 
Kuboniwa  (2010)  showed  the  followings.  First,  there  is  a  strong  positive 
relationship between the changes in real GDP and oil prices. Second, there is a strong 
positive impact of the changes in oil prices on Russian manufacturing, which differs 
markedly from the Dutch Disease (slower growth of manufacturing). Third, the increase 
in imports due to real appreciation of rubles, in turn, contributed to GDP growth in the 
trade sector, which is a major source of the overall Russian growth. These correlations 
make Russia sensitive to petroleum price fluctuations, and vulnerable to the “Russian 
disease” whenever global growth slackens.   
Figure 4 shows Russian GDP, manufacturing output and international oil price 
(Urals) movements for 1995-2010, based on the official data (website of Rosstat and the 7 
 
oil price data of Bloomberg). As can be seen, GDP and manufacturing output grew and 
contracted along with rises and falls in oil prices.   
 
Figure 4 GDP, Manufacturing and Oil Prices in Russia 
 
By using an OLS regression (log-log type with trend) we have the following result 
with all coefficients at the 1 percent significance level (adj. R
2= 0.977):   
gdp = 0.217*oil price + 2.16 percent (trend),                          (.1) 
where an italic lower case x denotes the growth rate of the variable x (dx/x). Since the 
elasticity of GDP with respect to oil prices is 0.22, a 10 percent increase in oil prices 
induces  a 2.2 percent  increase in GDP. Equation (.1) also  suggests  that  the  overall 
growth of GDP is supported by the exogenous trend of 2.2 percent (a technical progress, 
catch-up  efforts  and  so  on)  which  corresponds  to  TFP  (total  factor  productivity)  in 
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The average growth rates of GDP and international oil price (Urals) for 1995-2010 
were 3.7 percent and 10.8 percent respectively. It follows from Eq. (.1) that the oil price 
contribution  to  growth  (2.34  percentage  points)  explains  63  percent  of  the  overall 
growth. The residual 37 percent consists of the quasi-TFP (58 percent) and statistical 
error (minus 21 percent). About one half of the growth can be explained by the oil price 
impact. The quasi-TFP explains another half of the Russian growth. It is the growth 
trend; oil price fluctuation is a cyclical factor. 
It is noteworthy that Russia’s growth 1995-2010, the global financial crisis and the 
present recovery are explained by a simple equation such as Eq. (.1). This wasn’t the 
case 1960-1990 in the Soviet era.   
We also have the following regression result (adj. R
2= 0.948)
5: 
manufacturing output = 0.282*oil price + 1.39 percent (trend).                      (.2) 
The elasticity of manufacturing output with respect to oil prices is 0.282 much higher 
than the GDP elasticity whereas the quasi-TFP for manufacturing is much less than that 
for overall growth. 
Since the average growth rate of manufacturing output 1995-2010 was 3.4 percent, 
the oil price contribution to the manufacturing growth (3.03 percentage points) explains 
89 percent of the overall growth. The residual 11 percent consists of the quasi-TFP (41 
percent)  and  statistical  error  (minus  29  percent).  The  Russian  manufacturing  output 
                                                 
5  The coefficient of the oil price is significant at 1 percent level whereas that of the trend with the 
standard error of 0.8 percent is significant at 11 percent level (>10 percent). This problem can be avoided 
using monthly or quarterly data of manufacturing output for 1999M01-2010M12. When we omit the trend 
factor, we have the following regression at all coefficients with the 1 percent significance level (adj. 
R
2=0.941): manufacturing output = 0.378*oil price. 9 
 
heavily depends on the oil price factor, without a trace of Dutch Disease in the Russian 
manufacturing. 
 
4. The Impact of Trading Gains on Economic Growth in the BRICs   
All of the BRICs are oil producers, but Russia has been the sole oil exporter since 
1993 when China became an oil importer. A broader measure of the terms if trade effect 
is needed for Brazil, India and China. This can be accomplished by computing changes 
in the trading gains defined as the changes in real GDI to real GDP, that is, current net 
exports deflated by the import price  minus real net exports. When E and M denote 
exports and imports in current prices respectively, and P
e and P
m denote export and 
import prices (deflators) respectively, the real trading gain T is defined as: 









T is only meaningful in real terms if P
e = P
m= 1 and T = 0.   
The real GDI is defined as:   
GDI = GDP + T.   
The real growth of the trading gain cannot directly be defined. Instead, we measure 
the change in the trading gain as the change in F=GDI/GDP; f equals the difference 
between changes in GDI and GDP, that is to say, f = gdi – gdp. 
I used the following data for the BRICs. For Russia the official data on the website 
(as of May 1, 2010 and April 1, 2011) were employed. Real growth rates of GDP, 
exports,  imports  and  GDI  for  the  period  1995-2000,  the  period  2000-2003  and  the 
period  2004-2010  were  based  on  1995  constant  prices,  2000  constant  prices  and 
chain-method (annually changing base previous year prices) respectively. For Brazil the 
official data in the CEIC and IFS-WEO databases for 2005-2010 were used. The United 10 
 
Nations database for 1995-2009 was also used. Real of GDP, export, import and GDI 
growth  rates  were  calculated  by  using  the  chain-method  (changing  the  base  year 
annually). For  India, in addition to  IFS, UN and CEIC databases, the official press 
release for 2008-2010 on the website the Indian statistics office were employed. Real 
growth rates are calculated as in Brazil.   
China’s official GDP statistics on the expenditure side may be soft because most of 
its  GDP data are based on the production side. Supplementary data on  exports and 
imports in current prices as well as constant prices are not available. Only data on net 
exports in current prices are published. We employ China’s data on exports and imports 
in  current  prices  in  IFS for 1990-2009 and CEIC for 2010. These data in  US$  are 
converted to those in RMB (Yuan) through the annual average exchange rates in IFS. 
Net exports calculated from these data in RMB are consistent with the official data on 
the official website except for 2010. These data for 2007-2010 are shown in Table 1. As 
is seen from this table, the data in current prices of IFS are quite different from those of 
UN  for  2008-2009.  This  may  be  attributable  to  two  errors  in  the  United  Nations 
database (main aggregates of national accounts) for China’s foreign trade data in current 
prices during 2008-2009.
6  Although the UN data in current prices are not reliable, we 
employ them for real growth export and import rates of exports and imports 1995-2009 
because they are consistent with the framework of the national a ccounts. For 2010 we 
employ  percent  changes  of  exports  and  imports  estimated  in  the  WEO  database. 
Following  the  official  methodology,  our  estimations  of  China  for  1996 -2000, 
                                                 
6  As can be seen in Table 1, there are some similarities between figures in foreign trade of IFS in 
US$ and UN in RMB. The United Nations might misconstrue the data in US$ as RMB. The United 
Nations also might convert these erroneous figures to US$ by using IFS exchange rates. 11 
 
2001-2005 and 2006-2010 are made in 1990 constant prices, 2000 constant prices and 
2005 constant prices respectively.   
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Now we are in a position to present our estimations of real GDP, GDI and trading 
gains.  Figure  5  summarizes  real  GDP  and  GDI  (command -basis  GDP)  movements  in 
the BRICs. As was stated, differences between percent changes in GDI and GDP show 
changes in the trading gains (f).   
 

























































In Russia, large trading gains were observed for 2000 when the oil prices showed a 
sharp  increase.  Russia  also  showed  large  trading  losses  in  2009  due  to  an  adverse  oil 
shock.  The  favorable  growth  for  2003 -2007  was  coupled  with  relatively  large  trading 
gains. The recovery in 2010 accompanied rising trading gains.   
Brazil  suffered  from  relatively  small  trading  losses  for  1997 -2001  and  positive 
trading gains thereafter. In particular, Brazil’s trading gains rose 3.1 percent in 2008, 
despite oil price rises. The improvement of terms of trade was due to an increase in 
export prices against oil prices and a decrease in oil imports. It should be noted that 
Brazil showed a marked decrease in crude oil imports from 28.4 to 4.0 million tons for 14 
 
2000-2009, whereas it showed a remarkable increase in crude oil extraction from 63.2 
to 100.4 million tons for the same period (BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010). 
The recession in 2009 was associated with trading losses. The recovery in 2010 was 
coupled with positive trading gains.   
India also experienced relatively small trading losses 1999-2002. The impact of 
trading gains on the Indian growth appeared to be negligible for 2003-2010. In 2008 
India’s GDP growth rate fell despite positive trading gains.   
Along with Brazil and India, China too experienced relatively small trading losses 
1997-2000.  China’s  high  growth  for  2001-2006  was  coupled  with  trading  gains.  In 
particular, China experienced relatively large trading gains for 2005-2006 in spite of 
continuous increases in oil prices. However, it incurred trading losses 2007-2008. The 
change in trading gains of minus 1 percent in 2008 was relatively small. The fall in 
trading  gains  in  2008  however  was  about  3  percent,  employing  the  WEO  data  on 
percent changes in exports and imports for the year. This result may be more plausible 
taking the 2008 oil shock into account. The sharp fall in trading gains of 7.5 percent in 
2010  is  rather  surprising.  If  we  project  China’s  GDP  growth  based  on  the  past 
relationship between GDP and GDI as will be shown below, China’s GDP growth rate 
should be negative. However, the official preliminary growth rate was over 10 percent. 
So the situation in 2010 is unclear. Preliminary data on exports and imports in current 
and/or constant prices for 2010 might distort the gap between GDI and GDP. If the data 
are right, the Chinese government might have taken special measures to offset the great 
trading loss shock. Alternatively, the 2010 GDP growth  rate may be overestimated. 
Anyway, we need further investigation for China’s large trading losses in 2010. The 15 
 
National Bureau of Statistics of China as well as the Statistics Division of the United 
States should improve China’s GDP statistics on the expenditure side.   
    Using a log-log type regression with trend similar to Eq. (1) we have the following 
results of regressions: 
For Brazil: adj. R
2=0.990 
gdp = 1.789*f + 2.6 percent (trend)                                                                    (.3) 
All coefficients are significant at1 percent level. 
For Russia: adj. R
2=0.981 
gdp = 1.255*f + 2.6 percent (trend)                                                                    (.4) 
All coefficients are significant at 1 percent level. 
For India: adj. R
2=0.990 
gdp = 2.001*f + 7.0percent (trend)                                                                      (.5) 
All coefficients except for f are significant at 1 percent level. The coefficient of f is 
significant at 10 percent level (the p-value is 0.0546). 
For China:
7  adj. R
2=0.997 
gdp = 1.679*f + 9.2 percent (trend)                                   (.6) 
All coefficients including the dummy variable are significant at 1 percent level.   
Russia’s  elasticity  of  GDP  with  respect  to  trading  gains  is  the  smallest  in  the 
BRICs. This can be explained by large magnitude of changes in trading gains in Russia 
which were in the range between 12 percent in 2000 and -8.8 percent in 2009 (the gap 
of 21 percent). Those in Brazil were in the range between 3.1 percent and -0.8 (the gap 
of  3.9  percent).  The  values  of  changes  in  trading  gains  in  India  were  in  the  range 
                                                 
7  A dummy variable for 2010 is introduced into the regression. The value of coefficient of the dummy 
variable is 0.140 (14 percent). 16 
 
between  1.6  percent  and  -1.7  percent  (the  gap  of  3.3  percent).  Those  in  China  for 
1996-2009 were in  the  range between 2.1 percent  and  -1.3 percent  (the  gap of 3.4 
percent).   
Russia and Brazil show rather low values of exogenous trend factor whereas China 
and  India  show  large  values  of  exogenous  trend  factor.  This  reflects  the  large 
differences in GDP growth trends of two groups of Brasil-Russia and India-China. For 
Russia the quasi-TFP of 2.6 percent in Eq. (.3) is very close to the TFP of 2.5 percent 
derived  from  the  production  function  (Kuboniwa,  2011).  For  China  and  India  the 
coefficient of the trends are much greater than their TFP in the conventional growth 
accounting.   
Table 2 provides an accounting of the sources of BRICs growth based on Eqs. 
(.3)-(.6) 1995-2010. Russia showed the largest total impact of trading gains on its GDP 
growth (1.6 percentage points), followed by Brazil (0.5 percentage points). The share of 
contribution of trading gains to average growth, which shows a country’s dependency 
on trading gains or terms of trade, was 44 percent in Russia and 16.5 percent in Brazil. 
On the other hand, the total impact of trading gains on GDP growth in India and China 
was statistically meaningful but almost negligible although China’s great trading gains 
contraction in 2010 remains puzzling. 
    






5. Summary   
As O’Neill predicted the BRICs countries showed relatively rapid growth in the 
2000’s despite the global financial shock. Surprisingly, Russia was unscathed by the 
Dutch disease. Some BRICs countries were strongly affected by trading gains. About 
one half of the Russian growth can be explained by this impact. About 20 percent of the 
Brazilian growth can also be explained in the same way. India and China showed large 
impacts per unit of changes in trading gains on their growth as is shown by the values of 
elasticity of GDP with respect to changes in trading gains. However, the total impacts in 
India and China were almost negligible. It seems that if these correlations persist, Asia’s 
BRICs will be relatively immune to recurrent global financial crises.   
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